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Abstract
We determine the optimal timing for replacement of an emerging technology facing uncertainty
in both the output price and the arrival of new versions. Via a sequential investment framework,
we determine the value of the investment opportunity, the value of the project, and the optimal
investment rule under three diﬀerent strategies: compulsive, laggard, and leapfrog. In the ﬁrst
one, we assume that a ﬁrm invests sequentially in every version that becomes available, whereas
in the second and third ones, it can choose an older or a newer version, respectively. We show
that, under a compulsive strategy, technological uncertainty has a non–monotonic impact on the
optimal investment decision. In fact, uncertainty regarding the availability of future versions may
actually hasten investment in the current one. Next, by comparing the relative values of the three
strategies under diﬀerent rates of technological innovation, we ﬁnd that, under a low output price,
the compulsive strategy always dominates, whereas, at a high output price, the incentive to wait for
a new version and adopt either a leapfrog or a laggard strategy increases as the rate of innovation
increases, while high price uncertainty mitigates this eﬀect.
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1. Introduction
The implications of output price and technological uncertainty for investment and operational de-
cisions are crucial as they are not only pertinent to various industries, e.g., renewable energy (RE),
information technologies, and telecommunications, but also inﬂuence many of their participants,
e.g., private investors, research and development (R&D) units, etc. For example, given a speciﬁc
rate of innovation, a ﬁrm’s optimal strategy for upgrading equipment may inﬂuence a manufac-
turer’s R&D strategy and vice versa. Indeed, in the RE sector, Vestas faced unfavourable market
conditions when it failed to foresee that the demand for new turbines would weaken after 2008 and
continued to invest in manufacturing capacity and R&D (Financial Times, 2012). Similarly, taking
into account that RE projects are capital intensive, investors in wind turbines may have foregone
revenues by adopting an old technology without anticipating the likely arrival of more eﬃcient
ones. Here, we take the perspective of a ﬁrm that invests and operates a project under price and
technological uncertainty in order to provide insights on how to develop an optimal strategy for
technology adoption.
Although both technological decay and the random arrival of innovations reﬂect technological
uncertainty, empirical evidence has shown that the latter presents a greater incentive for replacing
a technology. For example, in the computer industry, hardware and software companies often
design a new version so that the value of an earlier one is reduced. As a result, private investors
replace equipment typically due to planned obsolescence and not because their lifetime has expired
(The Economist, 2009). This has far–reaching consequences considering that many industries, e.g.
smart phones, rely gradually more on computer technologies, and, thus, private investors are faced
with the task of making timely investment and operational decisions under increasing technological
uncertainty. Similarly, in the area of wind turbines, empirical research has indicated that innovation,
rather than technological decay, is the primary cause of turbine replacement (Jensen et al., 2002).
Of course, the replacement of a RE technology may be also inﬂuenced by other factors that are
beyond the scope of this paper, e.g., the limited availability of resource–rich locations. For example,
the opportunity cost from delaying the replacement of wind turbines in wind–rich locations is
endogenously related to the availability of land. Consequently, empirical analysis has indicated
that policies that are implemented in order to encourage the scrapping of older, poorly placed
turbines are ineﬃcient as they have a larger eﬀect on turbines that are located in areas with better
wind resources (Mauritzen, 2014).
Furthermore, estimating the proﬁt of projects based on emerging technologies is a complicated
process as it typically depends on several factors. For example, in the case of a wind farm, the
annual revenue may depend on electricity prices, wind speeds, and feed–in tariﬀs, as well as other
random variables. Thus, compared to commodity–based facilities that rely on more mature tech-
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nologies, RE projects are more exposed to output price and technological uncertainty as well as
their endogenous relationship. Nevertheless, in order to enable mathematical tractability, invest-
ment models usually address such features separately, and, as a result, questions regarding their
combined impact on investment and operational decisions remain open. In this paper, we address
this disconnect by developing a real options framework in order to address the problem of optimal
replacement of a technology under market and technological uncertainty. As a result, the contribu-
tion of this paper is threefold. First, we develop an analytical framework for sequential investment
under price and technological uncertainty. Second, we derive analytical and numerical results on
the eﬀect of price and technological uncertainty as well as their interaction on the decisions to
upgrade a technology by replacing old equipment with more eﬃcient ones. Third, we provide
managerial insights for investment and operational decisions based on analytical and numerical
results. Speciﬁcally, we show that price and technological uncertainty interact to aﬀect the optimal
strategy adoption decision when the output price is high and that this decision is independent of
technological uncertainty when the output price is low.
We proceed by discussing some related work in Section 2 and introduce assumptions and nota-
tion in Section 3. We address the problem of exercising a single replacement option in Section 4.1
and analyse a compulsive strategy, where a ﬁrm adopts two subsequent technologies, in Section 4.2.
In Section 5, we analyse the case where a ﬁrm can adopt either a leapfrog or a laggard strategy, and
in Section 6, we compare these two strategies with the compulsive one and show how the optimal
strategy can be determined endogenously. Section 7 provides numerical examples for each case
and illustrates the interaction between price and technological uncertainty in order to enable more
informed investment and operational decisions. Section 8 concludes and oﬀers directions for future
research.
2. Related Work
Although there is signiﬁcant literature in the area of sequential investment, analytical formu-
lations of problems that combine price and technological uncertainty are limited. Early examples
in the area of sequential investment include Majd and Pindyck (1987), who value a sequential in-
vestment under uncertainty and analyse the ﬂexibility that lies within the time it takes to build an
investment project, thereby showing how traditional valuation methods understate the value of a
project by ignoring this ﬂexibility. Dixit and Pindyck (1994) develop an analytical framework for
sequential investment assuming that the output price follows a geometric Brownian motion (GBM),
the project value depreciates exponentially, and the investor has an inﬁnite set of options.
More recent examples include Gollier et al. (2005), who allow for a construction lag between
subsequent stages and compare a ﬂexible sequence of small nuclear power plants with a nuclear
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power plant of large capacity. By measuring the option value generated by the modularity of
the ﬁrst project under electricity price uncertainty, they show that modularity may even trigger
investment in the initial module at a level below the now–or–never NPV threshold. Malchow–Møller
and Thorsen (2005) illustrate that, due to the possibility of updating equipment when investing in
an alternative energy technology, the required investment threshold is less sensitive to changes in
uncertainty and resembles the investment behaviour under the simple NPV rule. By contrast, the
value of waiting is reduced signiﬁcantly compared to the single–option case. Heydari (2010) presents
a methodology for solving a sequential decision–making problem with lags under electricity price
uncertainty taking the perspective of a load–serving entity that has its representative consumer on
an interruptible load contract with multiple exercise opportunities. Kort et al. (2010) show that,
contrary to the conventional real options intuition, higher price uncertainty makes a single–stage
investment more attractive relative to a more ﬂexible stepwise investment strategy.
In the area of investment under technological uncertainty, Balcer and Lippman (1984) analyse
the optimal timing of technology adoption under inﬁnite switching options by assuming that inno-
vations follow a discrete semi–Markov process. They ﬁnd that the timing of technology adoption
is inﬂuenced by expectations about future technological changes and that increasing technological
uncertainty tends to delay adoption. Grenadier and Weiss (1997) develop a model for the optimal
investment strategy of a ﬁrm that is confronted with a sequence of technological innovations as-
suming that technological progress follows a continuous–time stochastic process and that the price
is normally distributed. They consider four strategies; compulsive, leapfrog, buy and hold, and lag-
gard. In the ﬁrst, a ﬁrm adopts every technology that becomes available, whereas in the second it
skips an old technology in order to adopt the next one. In the third strategy, a ﬁrm purchases only
an early innovation, and in the ﬁnal strategy, it waits until a more eﬃcient one becomes available
before adopting the previous technology. Their results indicate that, depending on technological
uncertainty, a ﬁrm may adopt an available technology even though more valuable innovations may
occur in the future, while future decisions on technology adoption are path dependent.
Farzin et al. (1998) investigate the optimal timing of technology adoption assuming ongoing
technological progress and irreversibility. Although they account for technological uncertainty by
assuming that new technologies arrive according to a Poisson process, they consider a deterministic
production function, thereby assuming no output price uncertainty. Doraszelski (2001) identiﬁes
an error in Farzin et al. (1998) and shows that, compared to the NPV approach, a ﬁrm will defer
the adoption of a new technology when it takes the option value of waiting into account. Huisman
and Kort (2004) analyse a duopolistic competition in which ﬁrms face price and technological
uncertainty and show that a high arrival probability can turn a pre–emption game into a war
of attrition and that price uncertainty induces the adoption of a new technology. Miltersen and
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Schwartz (2007) develop a new real options approach for valuing R&D projects under uncertain
time to completion, operational ﬂexibility, and competition.
An implication of technological uncertainty is that a ﬁrm may have to choose between alternative
projects. Dixit (1993) analyses an irreversible choice among mutually exclusive projects under out-
put price uncertainty and ﬁnds that increasing returns and uncertainty make it optimal to wait for
the largest project. De´camps et al. (2006) extend Dixit (1993) by providing parameter restrictions
under which the optimal investment strategy is not a trigger strategy and the optimal investment
region is dichotomous. Siddiqui and Fleten (2010) analyse how a ﬁrm may proceed with staged
commercialisation and deployment of competing alternative energy technologies. They consider a
setting where a ﬁrm can choose between a new alternative technology, which requires cost–reducing
enhancement measures prior to deployment, and an existing RE technology. Although these are
examples of analytical frameworks for investment in alternative projects, the availability of these
projects is taken for granted as it is not subject to a probability distribution.
In this paper, we develop a framework for sequential investment in which we analyse the trade–
oﬀ between continuing to run an old technology and replacing it with successively improved versions
under price and technological uncertainty. The arrival of innovations is modelled via a Poisson
process as it enables the analysis when ﬁrms have no information about the decisions made by
R&D companies. We analyse three strategies, i.e., compulsive, leapfrog, and laggard; however,
unlike Grenadier and Weiss (1997), we analyse their endogenous relation assuming a stochastic
price process that facilitates the analysis of the impact of price and technological uncertainty
on the optimal investment rule under each strategy. We show that, under a compulsive strategy,
technological uncertainty has a non–monotonic impact on the optimal investment decision and may
actually accelerate investment. Additionally, we determine the range of prices where the optimal
strategy depends on technological uncertainty and ﬁnd that the required rate of innovation for
which a ﬁrm may consider waiting for the next technology decreases as the output price increases.
3. Assumptions and Notation
Taking the perspective of a price–taking ﬁrm, we assume that it has n = 1, 2, 3, ..., N investment
options available with N < ∞. Given a probability space (Ω,F ,P), we assume that technological
innovations follow a Poisson process {Mt, t ≥ 0}, where t is continuous and denotes time. The
process Mt is deﬁned in (1):
Mt =
∑
k≥1
1{t≥Tk} (1)
where T
k
=
∑k
n=1 yn and {yn , n ≥ 1} is a sequence of independent and identically distributed
random variables, such that yn ∼ exp(λ),∀n ≥ 1, i.e., fY (y) = λe−λy {y≥0}. Parameter λ ∈ R+
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denotes the intensity of the Poisson process and is independent of t. Intuitively, Mt counts the
number of random times T
k
that occur between 0 and t, and yn = Tn − Tn−1 is the time interval
between subsequent innovations. Hence, if no innovation has occurred for t years, then, with
probability λdt, an innovation will occur within the next short interval of time dt, i.e.,
dMt =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
1 ,with probability λdt
0 ,with probability 1− λdt
We assume that there is no operating cost associated with the technology, and that the revenue at
time t, Et, is independent of the Poisson process and follows a GBM that is described in (2), where
μ is the annual growth rate, σ the annual volatility, dZt the increment of the standard Brownian
motion, and ρ the subjective discount rate.
dEt = μEtdt+ σEtdZt, E0 ≡ E > 0 (2)
The output of technology version n is Dn (Dn+1 ≥ Dn , ∀n), and the corresponding investment cost
is In (In+1 ≥ In , ∀n). Additionally, τ
(N)
,m,n
, where ,m, n ∈ N, is the time at which technology m
is adopted given that technology  < m is installed while replacement n, n ≥ m > , is available,
and 
(N)
,m,n
denotes the corresponding optimal adoption threshold with N total versions available.
For example, τ
(N)
0,1,2
is the optimal time to invest in technology 1 when technology 2 is the latest
one available and no technology is currently in operation, while 
(N)
0,1,2
is the corresponding optimal
investment threshold. All options are perpetual and installed technologies last forever. Finally,
F
(N)
,m,n
(·) is the maximised expected NPV from investment in technology m given that technology 
is in operation and technology n is the latest one available for adoption, while Φ
(N)
n,n
(·) is the expected
value of an active project inclusive of embedded options when technology n is installed and is also the
latest one available. Notice that, in order to have a trade oﬀ between an old and a more eﬃcient
technology, we assume that at the point of indiﬀerence, ε, where ε is such that Φ
(n)
n−1,n−1 (ε) =
Φ
(n)
n,n
(ε), we have Φ
(n)
n,n
(ε) > 0, which, in turn implies, Dn∑n
i=1 Ii
<
Dn−1∑n−1
i=1 Ii
, ∀n
4. Compulsive Strategy
4.1. N = 1
We assume that a ﬁrm holds a single option to invest in a technology that will become available
at a random time T1 (Figure 1). Figure 2 indicates the diﬀerent states of operation and the value
function in each state. Notice that a transition due to a Poisson event is indicated by a broken
arrow whereas a transition due to investment by a solid arrow. In state (0, 0), the ﬁrm holds an
option to invest in a technology that is not available but may arrive according to a Poisson process.
When that happens, the ﬁrm moves into state (0, 1, 1) where it can exercise the option by incurring
a ﬁxed cost, thus moving to state (1, 1) where it continues to operate technology 1 forever.
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Figure 2: State transition diagram for N = 1
In order to determine the value function in each state, we work backwards and ﬁrst consider
state (1,1). When the ﬁrst technology becomes available, the ﬁrm has the option to incur a ﬁxed
cost, I1 , in order to adopt it and the expected NPV from immediate investment is described in (3).
Φ
(1)
1,1
(E) =
D1E
ρ− μ − I1 (3)
Notice that at T1 , we can have either E < 
(1)
0,1,1
or E ≥ (1)
0,1,1
. Thus, the value of the investment
opportunity in state (0, 1, 1) is described in (4)
F
(1)
0,1,1
(E) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
A
(1)
0,1,1
Eβ1 , E < 
(1)
0,1,1
Φ
(1)
1,1
(E) , 
(1)
0,1,1
≤ E
(4)
where β1 > 1 and β2 < 0 are the roots of
1
2σ
2β(β − 1) + μβ − ρ = 0 (all proofs can be found in the
appendix). The endogenous constant, A
(1)
0,1,1
, and the investment threshold, 
(1)
0,1,1
, are determined
via the value–matching and smooth–pasting conditions between the two branches of (4) and are
indicated in (5).
A
(1)
0,1,1
=

(1)1−β1
0,1,1
β1
D1
ρ− μ and 
(1)
0,1,1
=
β1
β1 − 1
I1(ρ− μ)
D1
(5)
Notice that, since there are no embedded investment options to impact the initial investment
decision, 
(1)
0,1,1
is independent of the rate of innovation, λ. Hence, a higher λ increases the likelihood
of an innovation but has no eﬀect on the optimal investment rule, which is subject to the GBM.
In state (0, 0), an innovation has not occurred yet but is likely to occur at some random time,
T1 , in the future. Thus, the value function in (0, 0) is described in (6).
Φ
(1)
0,0
(E) = (1− ρdt)λdtEE
[
F
(1)
0,1,1
(E + dE)
]
+ (1− ρdt)(1− λdt)EE
[
Φ
(1)
0,0
(E + dE)
]
(6)
The ﬁrst term on the right–hand side of (6) reﬂects the value of the option to adopt a technology
if it becomes available over the time interval dt, while the second term is the value of continuing to
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wait if an innovation does not take place over the time interval dt. By expanding the right–hand
side of (6) using Itoˆ’s lemma, we can re–write (6) as follows:
1
2
σ
2
E
2
Φ
(1)′′
0,0
(E) + μEΦ
(1)′
0,0
(E)− (ρ+ λ)Φ(1)
0,0
(E) + λF
(1)
0,1,1
(E) = 0 (7)
Notice that if E < 
(1)
0,1,1
, then, even if an innovation takes place, it cannot be adopted immediately,
and F
(1)
0,1,1
(E) is expressed via the top part of (4). Otherwise, the expression for F
(1)
0,1,1
(E) is indicated
in the bottom part of (4). Hence, the diﬀerential equations for Φ
(1)
0,0
(E) are indicated in (8).⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
1
2σ
2
E
2
Φ
(1)′′
0,0
(E) + μEΦ
(1)′
0,0
(E) − (ρ+ λ)Φ(1)
0,0
(E) + λA
(1)
0,1,1
Eβ1 = 0 , E < 
(1)
0,1,1
1
2σ
2
E
2
Φ
(1)′′
0,0
(E) + μEΦ
(1)′
0,0
(E) − (ρ+ λ)Φ(1)
0,0
(E) + λΦ
(1)
1,1
(E) = 0 , 
(1)
0,1,1
≤ E
(8)
The expression for Φ
(1)
0,0
(E) is indicated in (9), where A
(1)
0,1,1
is described in (5), while A
(1)
0,0
< 0 and
B
(1)
0,0
> 0 are determined via the value–matching and smooth–pasting conditions and are indicated
in (A–11) and (A–12) respectively.
Φ
(1)
0,0
(E) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
A
(1)
0,1,1
Eβ1 +A
(1)
0,0
Eδ1 , E < 
(1)
0,1,1
λD1E
(ρ+λ−μ)(ρ−μ) −
λI1
ρ+λ +B
(1)
0,0
Eδ2 , 
(1)
0,1,1
≤ E
(9)
Notice that δ1 > β2 > 1 and δ2 < β2 < 0 are the roots of the quadratic
1
2σ
2δ(δ−1)+μδ−(ρ+λ) = 0,
i.e., that λ = 0 ⇒ δ1 = β1 and δ2 = β2 . The ﬁrst term in the top part of (9) is the option to
invest should an innovation arrive; however, since this option is not available yet, we need to
adjust the option value via the second term. The ﬁrst term in the bottom part of (9) reﬂects
the expected present value of the revenues from the new technology, and the second term is the
expected investment cost. Finally, the third term reﬂects the probability that the price will drop
into the waiting region before the occurrence of the innovation. Notice that the relative loss in the
value function Φ
(1)
0,0
(E) due to technological uncertainty is described in (10).
F
(1)
0,1,1
(E)− Φ(1)
0,0
(E)
F (1)
0,1,1
(E)
= − A
(1)
0,0
Eδ1
A(1)
0,1,1
Eβ1
, E < 
(1)
0,1,1
(10)
Hence, if λ = 0, then no innovation will occur and Φ
(1)
0,0
(E) = 0. By contrast, when λ → ∞, the
loss in value due to the likelihood of an innovation converges to zero, and, thus, Φ
(1)
0,0
→ F (1)
0,1,1
.
Consequently, Φ
(1)
0,0
∈
[
0, F
(1)
0,1,1
)
∀λ ∈ R+ (see Propositions 4.1 and 4.2).
4.2. N = 2
We extend the previous framework by assuming that a ﬁrm holds two investment options and
that it invests in each technology that becomes available ignoring the option to wait to choose
between the two. Hence, the transition diagram of Figure 2 is extended by adding states (1, 2, 2)
and (2, 2).
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Figure 3: State transition diagram for N = 2
The expected NPV from immediate investment in the second technology is described in (11).
Φ
(2)
2,2
(E) =
D2E
ρ− μ − (I2 + I1) (11)
Next, the value function in state (1, 2, 2) is indicated in (12)
F
(2)
1,2,2
(E) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
Φ
(1)
1,1
(E) +A
(2)
1,2,2
Eβ1 , E < 
(2)
1,2,2
Φ
(2)
2,2
(E) , 
(2)
1,2,2
≤ E
(12)
where the endogenous constant A
(2)
1,2,2
and investment threshold 
(2)
1,2,2
are indicated in (13).
A
(2)
1,2,2
=

(2)1−β1
1,2,2
β1
(D2 −D1)
ρ− μ and 
(2)
1,2,2
=
β1
β1 − 1
I2(ρ− μ)
D2 −D1
(13)
Thus, the value of a project with an installed ﬁrst technology and a single remaining embedded
investment option, given that the new technology is not available yet, is
Φ
(2)
1,1
(E) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
Φ
(1)
1,1
(E) +A
(2)
1,2,2
Eβ1 +A
(2)
1,1
Eδ1 , E < 
(2)
1,2,2
E[λD2+(ρ−μ)D1 ]
(ρ+λ−μ)(ρ−μ) −
λI2
ρ+λ +B
(2)
1,1
Eδ2 − I1 , 
(2)
1,2,2
≤ E
(14)
where A
(2)
1,1
< 0 and B
(2)
1,1
> 0 are determined via the value–matching and smooth–pasting conditions
between the two branches of (14) and are indicated in (B–6) and (B–7) respectively. The ﬁrst term
in the top part of (14) is the expected value from operating the ﬁrst technology, while the second
term reﬂects the option to invest in the second technology, which is not available yet, and, therefore,
must be adjust via the third term. The ﬁrst term in the bottom part of (14) reﬂects the expected
present value of the revenues from the second technology and the second term is the expected
investment cost. Finally, the third term is the probability that the price will drop into the waiting
region before the occurrence of the innovation. As in (10), a higher λ increases the likelihood
of the second innovation and reduces the relative loss in Φ
(2)
1,1
(E), which, in turn, implies that
Φ
(2)
1,1
(E) ∈
[
Φ
(1)
1,1
(E), F
(2)
1,2,2
(E)
)
∀λ ∈ R+. These results are shown more generally in Propositions
4.1 and 4.2. Notice that, under a compulsive strategy, m = + 1 and n = m+ 1 ∀,m, n ∈ N.
Proposition 4.1. ∀,m, n ∈ N the relative loss in Φ(n)
m,m
(E) converges to zero as λ → ∞, i.e.,
λ → ∞ ⇒ F
(n)
m,n,n
(E)− Φ(n)
m,m
(E)
F
(n)
m,n,n
(E)
→ 0, ∀E < (n)
m,n,n
Proposition 4.2. ∀,m, n ∈ N and ∀λ ∈ R+, Φ(m)
,
(E) ∈
[
Φ
()
,
(E), F
(m)
,m,m
(E)
)
, E ≤ (m)
,m,m
.
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Next, we step back and consider the option to invest in the ﬁrst technology that includes an
embedded option to perform a single replacement. Notice that the value of an active project with
a single embedded replacement option is described in (14) for E < 
(2)
1,2,2
. Consequently, F
(2)
0,1,1
(E) is
described in (15), where the top part reﬂects the value of the option to invest and the bottom part
is the expected NPV at investment. Notice that the latter consists of the value from investment in
the ﬁrst technology and a single embedded option to upgrade it when an innovation occurs.
F
(2)
0,1,1
(E) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
A
(2)
0,1,1
Eβ1 , E < 
(2)
0,1,1
Φ
(2)
1,1
(E) , 
(2)
0,1,1
≤ E
(15)
Although the optimal investment threshold 
(2)
0,1,1
and the endogenous constant A
(2)
0,1,1
are now
obtained numerically via the value–matching and smooth–pasting conditions (B–9) and (B–10), it
is possible to investigate the impact of λ on 
(2)
0,1,1
by expressing F
(2)
0,1,1
(E) as in (16).
F
(2)
0,1,1
(E) =
(
E

(2)
0,1,1
)β1 [
D1
(2)
0,1,1
ρ− μ − I1 +A
(2)
1,2,2

(2)β1
0,1,1
+A
(2)
1,1

(2)δ1
0,1,1
]
,∀E < (2)
0,1,1
(16)
Then, the optimal investment rule is indicated in (17) where we equate the marginal beneﬁt (MB)
of delaying investment to the marginal cost (MC).(
E
(2)
0,1,1
)β1 [
D1
ρ− μ +
β1
(2)
0,1,1
I1 − β1A
(2)
1,1

(2)δ1−1
0,1,1
]
=
(
E
(2)
0,1,1
)β1 [
β1D1
ρ− μ − δ1A
(2)
1,1

(2)δ1−1
0,1,1
]
(17)
The ﬁrst term on the left–hand side of (17) is the incremental project value created by waiting
until the price is higher, while the second term represents the reduction in the MC of waiting due
to saved investment cost. Similarly, the ﬁrst term on the right–hand side reﬂects the opportunity
cost of forgone cash ﬂows discounted appropriately. Since A
(2)
1,1
< 0, the third and second term
on the left– and right–hand side, respectively, reﬂect the loss in option value from not having the
second technology yet. Speciﬁcally, the third term on the left–hand side is the MB from postponing
the loss in value, whereas the second term on the right–hand side is the MC from a potentially
greater impact of the loss from waiting for a higher threshold price. Notice that it is the impact of
λ on these two terms that determines the overall behaviour of the 
(2)
0,1,1
with respect to λ, and, as
Proposition 4.3 indicates more generally, the impact of λ on 
(m)
,m,m
is non–monotonic.
Proposition 4.3. ∀,m, n ∈ N the impact of λ on (n)
,m,m
is non–monotonic.
Finally, we step back to state (0,0) in order to determine the value of a project with two embedded
replacement options that are subject to the arrival of the corresponding technologies. Notice that,
unlike (7), now the value of the ﬁrst investment option, F
(2)
0,1,1
(E), includes a single embedded
option to perform one upgrade and that, as long as 
(2)
0,1,1
< 
(2)
1,2,2
, the solution depends on whether
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E < 
(2)
0,1,1
or E ≥ (2)
0,1,1
. If E < 
(2)
0,1,1
, then, even if the ﬁrst technology became available, it would
still be optimal to delay investment, whereas if E ≥ (2)
0,1,1
, then investment should be exercised
immediately. The expression of Φ
(2)
0,0
(E) is indicated in (18), where A
(2)
0,0
< 0 and B
(2)
0,0
> 0 are
obtained via the value–matching and smooth–pasting conditions between the two branches and are
indicated in (B–14) and (B–15) respectively.
Φ
(2)
0,0
(E) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
A
(2)
0,1,1
Eβ1 +A
(2)
0,0
Eδ1 , E < 
(2)
0,1,1
λD1E
(ρ+λ−μ)(ρ−μ) −
λI1
ρ+λ + A
(2)
1,2,2
Eβ1 +A
(2)
1,1
Eδ1 +B
(2)
0,0
Eδ2 , 
(2)
0,1,1
≤ E
(18)
Similarly, we can determine the required investment threshold and the value of the option to invest
for a project with any number of replacement options under a compulsive strategy.
5. Leapfrog versus Laggard Strategy
It is possible that a better technology becomes available while a ﬁrm waits in order to invest
in an existing one, thus replacing the initial investment option with the option to choose between
two alternative technologies. Here, we assume that a ﬁrm would not want to adopt an existing
technology before comparing it to the next one. Consequently, the transition from (0,1,1) to (1,1)
is not possible, and the only state prior to (1,2,2) is (0,1∨2), from which the ﬁrm may either adopt
a laggard strategy and invest in the ﬁrst technology with the embedded option to upgrade to the
second or adopt a leapfrog strategy and invest directly in the second technology (Figure 4). Since
the analysis related to states (2,2) and (1,2,2) is the same as in Section 4.2, we proceed directly
to state (2, 2). Notice that if the ﬁrm adopts the second technology directly from (0,1∨2), then it
does not incur the cost I1 , and the expected NPV from immediate investment is indicated in (19).
Φ
(2)
2,2
(E) =
D2E
ρ− μ − I2 (19)
Next, we consider state (0,1∨2) where the ﬁrm has the option to choose either the ﬁrst technology
with the option to switch to the second or the second technology directly. Due to the presence of
the second technology, there exist two waiting regions, i.e.,
(
0, 
(2)
0,1,2
]
and
[

(2)
0,1,2
, 
(2)
0,2,2
]
. If E < 
(2)
0,1,2
,
then the ﬁrm will adopt a laggard strategy, i.e., wait until E = 
(2)
0,1,2
and then invest in the ﬁrst
technology. If E ∈
[

(2)
0,1,2
, 
(2)
0,2,2
]
, then the ﬁrm can either adopt a laggard or a leapfrog strategy.
Speciﬁcally, if the output price increases to 
(2)
0,2,2
, then the ﬁrm will invest in the second technology,
but if it drops to 
(2)
0,1,2
, then it will invest in the ﬁrst one. Consequently, the laggard strategy is
adopted either when the output price is low, i.e., E < 
(2)
0,1,2
, and increases to 
(2)
0,1,2
or when the
output price is high, i.e., E ∈
[

(2)
0,1,2
, 
(2)
0,2,2
]
, and decreases to 
(2)
0,1,2
.
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Figure 4: State transition diagram for N = 2 under leapfrog and laggard strategy
Hence, assuming that 
(2)
0,1,2
< 
(2)
1,2,2
, then according to De´camps et al. (2006), the value function
in state (0,1∨2) is indicated in (20), where A(2)
0,1∨2 and 
(2)
0,1,2
are determined via the value–matching
and smooth–pasting conditions between the ﬁrst two branches, while 
(2)
0,1,2
, 
(2)
0,2,2
, G
(2)
0,1∨2 , and H
(2)
0,1∨2
via the second, third, and fourth branch.
F
(2)
0,1∨2(E) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
A
(2)
0,1∨2E
β1 , E < 
(2)
0,1,2
F
(2)
1,2,2
(E) , 
(2)
0,1,2
≤ E ≤ (2)
0,1,2
G
(2)
0,1∨2E
β2 +H
(2)
0,1∨2E
β1 , 
(2)
0,1,2
< E < 
(2)
0,2,2
Φ
(2)
2,2
(E) , 
(2)
0,2,2
≤ E
(20)
Interestingly, although now both technologies are available, and, as a result, there is no loss in
the value of the option to invest in the ﬁrst one, the corresponding investment threshold under a
laggard strategy when E < 
(2)
0,1,2
is greater than that under a compulsive strategy when the arrival
of the second innovation is uncertain, i.e., 
(2)
0,1,2
> 
(2)
0,1,1
, whereas 
(2)
0,1,2
= 
(2)
0,1,1
when λ = 0 or λ → ∞.
More generally, Proposition 5.1 shows that the absence (λ = 0) or presence (λ → ∞) of the second
technology does not aﬀect the decision to invest in the ﬁrst one and indicates that a ﬁrm is more
willing to adopt the current technology when the arrival of a subsequent one is uncertain.
Proposition 5.1. ∀,m, n ∈ N we have (n)
,m,m
< 
(n)
,m,n
∀λ ∈ (0,+∞), whereas λ = 0 ⇒ (n)
,m,m
=

(n)
,m,n
and λ → ∞ ⇒ (n)
,m,m
→ (n)
,m,n
.
The value function in state (0,1,1) is described in (21). The ﬁrst term on the right–hand side is the
option to invest in the ﬁrst technology with an embedded option to upgrade to the second one if no
innovation takes place within the time interval dt. However, as the second term indicates, if during
dt an innovation occurs, then the ﬁrm obtains the option to choose between two technologies.
F
(2)
0,1,1
(E) = (1− ρdt)(1 − λdt)EE
[
F
(2)
0,1,1
(E + dE)
]
+ (1− ρdt)λdtEE
[
F
(2)
0,1∨2 (E + dE)
]
(21)
Notice that (21) has to be solved separately for each of the four regions of E that are indicated in
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(20). By substituting for F
(2)
0,1∨2(E) in (21), we obtain the four diﬀerential equations for F
(2)
0,1,1
(E).
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1
2σ
2
E
2
F
(2)′′
0,1,1
(E) + μEF
(2)′
0,1,1
(E)− (ρ+ λ)F (2)
0,1,1
(E) + λA
(2)
0,1∨2,2E
β1 = 0 , E < 
(2)
0,1,2
1
2σ
2
E
2
F
(2)′′
0,1,1
(E) + μEF
(2)′
0,1,1
(E)− (ρ+ λ)F (2)
0,1,1
(E) + λF
(2)
0,2,2
(E) = 0 , 
(2)
0,1,2
≤ E ≤ (2)
0,1,2
1
2σ
2
E
2
F
(2)′′
0,1,1
(E) + μEF
(2)′
0,1,1
(E)− (ρ+ λ)F (2)
0,1,1
(E)
+ λ
[
G
(2)
0,1∨2E
β2 +H
(2)
0,1∨2E
β1
]
= 0 , 
(2)
0,1,2
< E < 
(2)
0,2,2
1
2σ
2
E
2
F
(2)′′
0,1,1
(E) + μEF
(2)′
0,1,1
(E)− (ρ+ λ)F (2)
0,1,1
(E) + λF
(2)
2,2
(E) = 0 , 
(2)
0,2,2
≤ E
(22)
By solving for F
(2)
0,1,1
(E), we obtain the solution indicated in (23), where A
(2)
1,2,2
is described in (13)
and the endogenous constants A
(2)
0,1,1
, L
(2)
0,1,1
, P
(2)
0,1,1
, Q
(2)
0,1,1
, R
(2)
0,1,1
, and J
(2)
0,1,1
are determined numerically
via the value–matching and smooth–pasting conditions between the branches of (23).
F
(2)
0,1,1
(E) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
A
(2)
0,1∨2E
β1 + P
(2)
0,1,1
Eδ1 , E < 
(2)
0,1,2
λD1E
(ρ+λ−μ)(ρ−μ) − λI1ρ+λ +A
(2)
1,2,2
Eβ1 + L
(2)
0,1,1
Eδ1 +B
(2)
0,1,1
Eδ2 , 
(2)
0,1,2
≤ E ≤ (2)
0,1,2
G
(2)
0,1∨2E
β2 +H
(2)
0,1∨2E
β1 +Q
(2)
0,1,1
Eδ1 +R
(2)
0,1,1
Eδ2 , 
(2)
0,1,2
< E < 
(2)
0,2,2
λD2E
(ρ+λ−μ)(ρ−μ) −
λI2
ρ+λ + J
(2)
0,1,1
Eδ2 , 
(2)
0,2,2
≤ E
(23)
Finally, following the same steps as in the case of F
(2)
0,1,1
(E), we can determine the value function
in state (0, 0). Notice that, without loss of generality, the comparison of F
(2)
0,1,1
(E) under the two
strategies can be done in state (0, 1, 1), and, therefore, the analysis of state (0, 0) is omitted. In
fact, since we know from Proposition 5.1 that 
(2)
0,1,1
≤ (2)
0,1,2
, the comparison of the strategies at
(0, 1, 1) can be made separately for each of the regions of E that are indicated in (15) and (23).
6. Comparison of the Strategies
Despite the incentive to delay investment in an old technology in order to compare it with a
newer one, it is possible that by the time that the latter becomes available it is already optimal to
invest in the former. Here, we extend Section 5 by assuming that the choice of strategy depends on
E and λ, and, thus, it is not determined exogenously. Hence, both (0, 1, 1) → (1, 1) and (0,1,1)→
(0,1∨2) are possible transitions (Figure 5), and the ﬁnal choice of strategy is endogenous.
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Figure 5: State transition diagram for N = 2 under leapfrog and laggard strategy
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Figure 6 summarises the possible strategies for diﬀerent values of E and λ. As shown in Proposition
6.1, the compulsive strategy is optimal ∀λ ∈ R+ within the ﬁrst two price regions, i.e., E ≤ (2)
0,1,2
.
Intuitively, even if a second technology were available, then a ﬁrm would have to wait long before
the output price reaches the corresponding investment threshold and the expected payoﬀ from
investment in the second technology does not oﬀset the forgone revenues from skipping the ﬁrst
one. By contrast, in the third and fourth region, i.e., E > 
(2)
0,1,2
, the optimal strategy depends on λ.
Indeed, the required λ for which a ﬁrm may consider waiting for the next technology decreases as
the output price increases, and, as shown in Proposition 6.2, it is possible to determine the required
value of λ ∀E > (2)
0,1,2
. Additionally, high price uncertainty delays investment in both the ﬁrst and
the second technology and facilitates a laggard strategy in state (0,1∨2), thereby increasing the
range of prices where a leapfrog or a laggard strategy may be considered.
E
σ σ σ
•

(2)
0,1,2
•

(2)
0,1,2
•

(2)
0,2,2
•λ1
λ2
λ
•
Compulsive
Compulsive
Compulsive
Compulsive
Compulsive Compulsive
LeapfrogLeapfrog/
Laggard
Figure 6: Comparison of the strategies
More speciﬁcally, notice that in the ﬁrst two regions, i.e., E ∈
(
0, 
(2)
0,1,2
]
, the compulsive strategy
always dominates the leapfrog/laggard strategy (Proposition 6.1). Indeed, under a leapfrog/laggard
strategy, F
(2)
0,1,1
(E) consists of the expected payoﬀ from investment in the ﬁrst technology with a
single embedded option to replace it conditional on the arrival of the second innovation. Hence,
F
(2)
0,1,1
(E) is greater under a compulsive strategy ∀λ ∈ R+, since the ﬁrm receives the same payoﬀ
without having to wait for the second innovation. Consequently, if E ∈
(
0, 
(2)
0,1,2
]
the ﬁrm does
not need to wait until 
(2)
0,1,2
in order to invest in the ﬁrst technology (De´camps et al., 2006), since,
under a compulsive strategy, the investment option should be exercised at 
(2)
0,1,1
≤ (2)
0,1,2
.
Proposition 6.1. ∀E ∈
(
0, 
(2)
0,1,2
]
, if the investment region in state (0, 1 ∨ 2) is dichotomous, then
the compulsive strategy dominates the leapfrog/laggard strategy ∀λ ∈ R+.
By contrast, when the output price is high, i.e., E > 
(2)
0,1,2
, it is possible that a laggard or a leapfrog
strategy dominates. Intuitively, a high output price compensates for a low λ and increases the
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incentive to wait for the second technology, while a low output price increases the rate λ for which
a ﬁrm may consider waiting for the second technology. More speciﬁcally, if E ∈
(

(2)
0,1,2
, 
(2)
0,2,2
]
, then
the payoﬀ from a compulsive strategy must be compared to the value of the option to choose either
one of the two technologies. In eﬀect, the value of the option to choose between two technologies
may be higher than the expected NPV from adopting the older one if the rate of innovation in high.
Similarly, if E ∈
(

(2)
0,2,2
,∞
)
, then the value from immediate investment in the second technology,
which, under a leapfrog strategy, is contingent upon its arrival, must be compared to the value
from immediate investment in the ﬁrst technology with an embedded option to upgrade it. If λ is
high, then it may be preferable to wait for the second innovation rather than invest in the ﬁrst one.
As Proposition 6.2 indicates, ∀E ∈
(

(2)
0,1,2
,∞
]
it is possible to determine the optimal strategy for
each pair (E,λ) as well as the minimum rates λ1 and λ2 for which a ﬁrm would adopt a leapfrog
or a leapfrog/laggard strategy respectively.
Proposition 6.2. ∃ λ1 , λ2 ∈ R+ with λ1 ≤ λ2 :
i : ∀λ > λ1 , ∃B ⊆
(

(2)
0,2,2
,∞
)
: ∀E ∈ B, the leapfrog strategy dominates
ii : ∀λ > λ2 , ∃A ⊂
(

(2)
0,1,2
, 
(2)
0,2,2
]
: ∀E ∈ A, the leapfrog/laggard strategy dominates
Hence, by taking into account the arrival of innovations, we obtain the maximised value in state
(0, 1, 1), which is described in (24). The ﬁrst two branches of (24) indicate that the compulsive
strategy is always better for E < 
(2)
0,1,2
regardless of λ. However, as the bottom two branches
indicate, for E > 
(2)
0,1,2
the optimal strategy depends on E and λ.
F
(2)
0,1,1
(E) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
A
(2)
0,1,1
Eβ1 , E < 
(2)
0,1,2
Φ
(2)
1,1
(E) +A
(2)
1,2,2
Eβ1 +A
(2)
1,1
Eδ1 , 
(2)
0,1,2
< E < 
(2)
0,1,2
maxE,λ
{
Φ
(2)
1,1
(E) +A
(2)
1,2,2
Eβ1 +A
(2)
1,1
Eδ1 ,
G
(2)
0,2
Eβ2 +H
(2)
0,2
Eβ1 +Q
(2)
0,1,1
Eδ1 +R
(2)
0,1,1
Eδ2
}
, 
(2)
0,1,2
< E < 
(2)
0,2,2
maxE,λ
{
Φ
(2)
1,1
(E) +A
(2)
1,2,2
Eβ1 +A
(2)
1,1
Eδ1 ,
λD2E
(ρ+λ−μ)(ρ−μ) −
λI2
ρ+λ + J
(2)
0,1,1
Eδ2
}
, 
(2)
0,2,2
≤ E
(24)
7. Numerical Results
7.1. Compulsive Strategy with N = 1
For the numerical results, the values of the diﬀerent parameters are ρ = 0.1, μ = 0.01, and
σ ∈ [0, 0.3]. Also, for the purposes of the analysis we assume that λ ∈ [0, 1]. We begin with the
case of N = 1 and set I1 = 1500 and D1 = 16. Figure 7 illustrates the value of a single investment
option, F
(1)
0,1,1
(·), the expected NPV from exercising it, Φ(1)
1,1
(·), and the value of an option to perform
a single upgrade which is not available yet, Φ
(1)
0,0
(·). Notice that the value function in state (0, 0)
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increases with higher λ. Indeed, for λ = 0, no innovation will take place, and, as a result, the
ﬁrm will continue to wait forever. By allowing for λ > 0, the likelihood of an innovation increases,
thereby raising the value function Φ
(1)
0,0
(·). Once a new technology arrives, the ﬁrm has the option to
adopt it, and the required investment threshold is 
(1)
0,1,1
= 14.06. Notice that there are no additional
investment options available to inﬂuence the value of the initial investment decision. As a result,
conditional on the arrival of an innovation, the likelihood of exercising the investment option in
state (0,1,1) is subject only to the underlying stochastic process. Consequently, as indicated in (5),
λ impacts the likelihood of an innovation but not the required investment threshold.
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Figure 7: Option and project value under a compulsive strategy with N = 1, σ = 0.2, and λ = 0, 0.01, 0.1
7.2. Compulsive Strategy with N = 2
Next, we extend the case of compulsive strategy by assuming that a ﬁrm holds two investment
options. Figure 8 illustrates the value functions in states (2, 2), (1, 2, 2), (1, 1), (0, 1, 1), and (0, 0).
The numerical assumptions I1 = 500,D1 = 8, I2 = 1500, and D2 = 16, imply that the second
technology is three times as expensive as the ﬁrst one and twice as eﬃcient, i.e., they satisfy the
assumption
D2
I1+I2
<
D1
I1
. For λ = 0.01, Figure 8 illustrates the value of the investment options
F
(2)
0,1,1
(·) and F (2)
1,2,2
(·), the corresponding expected NPVs from exercising them, i.e., Φ(2)
1,1
(·) and
Φ
(2)
2,2
(·) respectively, and, ﬁnally, the value of a project with two embedded investment options,
Φ
(2)
0,0
(·), that are subject to the arrival of the corresponding technologies. Like in the case N = 1,
the value function F
(2)
1,2,2
(·) and the investment threshold (2)
1,2,2
are independent of λ. For λ = 0.01,
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the value function in state (0,0) increases with E since now both of the embedded investment
options have a positive value. Additionally, in state (0, 1, 1) the value of the embedded investment
option is positive but, since the arrival of the second technology remains uncertain, F
(2)
0,1,1
(·) lies
between Φ
(2)
0,0
(·) and F (2)
1,2,2
(·), as shown in Proposition 4.2. In fact, F (2)
0,1,1
(·) is greater than Φ(2)
0,0
(·)
since in state (0, 0) the availability of the two technologies is uncertain, while, at the same time, it
is lower than F
(2)
1,2,2
(·) where both technologies are available.
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Figure 8: Option and project value under a compulsive strategy with N = 2, σ = 0.2, and λ = 0.01
The left panel in Figure 9 illustrates the relative loss in the value function, Φ
(2)
1,1
(·), due to the
likelihood associated with the arrival of the second innovation. This is expressed in (25), where
F
(2)
1,2,2
(E) is the value of the option to invest when the ﬁrst technology is in operation and the second
technology is available for adoption.
F
(2)
1,2,2
(E)− Φ(2)
1,1
(E)
F (2)
1,2,2
(E)
, E ≤ (2)
1,2,2
(25)
Notice that for λ = 0, we have A
(2)
1,1
= −A(2)
1,2,2
, and, thus, the relative loss in Φ
(2)
1,1
(·) is maximised
since the value of the embedded option to invest in the second technology is zero. Then, for
low values of λ, the relative loss in Φ
(2)
1,1
(·) decreases quickly because a higher λ increases the
likelihood of the arrival of the second technology. Above a certain value of λ, the decrease is less
pronounced since the likelihood of at least one innovation occurring converges to one, and, as a
result, the relative loss in option value converges to zero, as shown in Proposition 4.1. As the
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right panel illustrates, for low values of λ the rapid decrease in the relative loss in Φ
(2)
1,1
(·) increases
the incentive to invest and lowers the required investment threshold, 
(2)
0,1,1
. Surprisingly, however,

(2)
0,1,1
does not always decrease with higher λ. Indeed, when λ is low, 
(2)
0,1,1
decreases as the rate of
innovation increases; however, as λ increases further, 
(2)
0,1,1
increases and converges to its value for
λ = 0, as shown in Proposition 5.1. Intuitively, when the rate of innovation is low, the extra beneﬁt
due to the decrease in the relative loss in Φ
(2)
1,1
(·) is more pronounced than the incentive to delay
investment. By contrast, when innovations arrive more frequently, the decrease in the relative loss
in Φ
(2)
1,1
(·) is less pronounced than the value of waiting, which increases with higher uncertainty.
Finally, uncertainty raises the value of the investment opportunity, thereby increasing the incentive
to delay investment, and, in turn, the required investment threshold, while, at the same time, it
makes the non–monotonic impact of λ on 
(2)
0,1,1
more pronounced.
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 10
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
Poisson Intensity, λ
R
el
at
iv
e
L
os
s
in
Φ
(2
)
1
,1
 
 
σ = 0.3
σ = 0.2
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 19
9.5
10
10.5
11
11.5
12
Poisson Intensity, λ
O
pt
im
al
In
ve
st
m
en
t
T
hr
es
ho
ld
,
(2
)
0
,1
,1
 
 
σ = 0.3
σ = 0.2
Figure 9: Relative loss in option value (left) and optimal investment threshold (right) versus σ, λ
In order to obtain additional insights on the impact of λ on 
(2)
0,1,1
, Figure 10 illustrates the MB
and MC of delaying investment for σ = 0.2 and λ = 0, 0.1, 0.3. Notice that, as λ increases, both the
MB and the MC of delaying investment decrease because the frequent arrival of new technologies
erodes the value of waiting to invest in the currently available technology and lowers the forgone
revenues from waiting. Intuitively, for low λ, technologies are not arriving frequently, and, as a
result, a ﬁrm would be more willing to adopt the current technology sooner in order to have a shot
at the yet unreleased version. By contrast, as λ increases, innovations take place more frequently,
thereby increasing the incentive to delay investment in order to avoid making a mistake.
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Figure 10: MB and MC of delaying investment for, σ = 0.2 and λ = 0, 0.1, 0.3
7.3. Leapfrog versus Laggard Strategy
Figure 11 illustrates the value functions in the states (0, 1∨ 2) and (0, 1, 1), when the transition
from (0,1,1) to (1,1) is not considered. If E < 9.37, then the ﬁrm must wait until E = 9.37 and
adopt the ﬁrst technology. Also, if E ∈ [10.96, 14.51], then, due to the presence of the second
technology, the ﬁrm has to wait again, i.e., refrain from adopting any technology. Speciﬁcally, if
E increases to 14.51, then the ﬁrm will invest directly in the second technology, but if E drops to
10.96, then it will invest in the ﬁrst technology while holding the option to switch to the second.
Notice that the value function F
(2)
0,1,1
(·) is lower than F (2)
0,1∨2(·) because F
(2)
0,1∨2(·) reﬂects the value of
the option to choose between two technologies that are available, whereas F
(2)
0,1,1
(·) reﬂects the same
value function in the absence of the second technology. However, as λ increases, the loss in value
due to the likelihood associated with the arrival of the second technology decreases and F
(2)
0,1,1
(·)
converges to F
(2)
0,1∨2(·).
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Figure 11: Option and project value for N = 2, σ = 0.2 under leapfrog and laggard strategy
The impact of volatility on the optimal investment thresholds 
(2)
0,1,2
, 
(2)
0,1,2
, 
(2)
1,2,2
, and 
(2)
0,2,2
is
illustrated in Figure 12. Notice that, since the investment thresholds 
(2)
0,1,2
and 
(2)
0,1,2
move in
opposite directions with higher volatility, it is possible that 
(2)
0,1,2
> 
(2)
0,1,2
. In that case, the region of
direct investment in the ﬁrst technology disappears, and, therefore, it is optimal to adopt a leapfrog
strategy, i.e., wait until E = 
(2)
0,2,2
and then invest in the second technology.
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7.4. Comparison of the Strategies
Figure 13 illustrates the value function F
(2)
0,1,1
(·) under a compulsive and a leapfrog/laggard
strategy for λ = 0.1 and 0.6. Notice that an increase in λ, which is indicated by the direction of
the arrows, increases the value of the embedded options and causes both value functions to shift
upward, yet the value function under a compulsive strategy is less responsive. Interestingly, when
λ = 0.1, the value function in state (0,1,1) is always greater under a compulsive strategy than under
a leapfrog/laggard strategy, while, for λ = 0.6, the leapfrog/laggard strategy dominates when the
output prices is high. Notice that, as shown in Proposition 6.2, the leapfrog/laggard strategy can
dominate only for E > 
(2)
0,1,2
, whereas the compulsive strategy dominates always when E < 
(2)
0,1,2
as
shown in Proposition 6.1.
0 5 10 15 20 25 30−500
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
Output Price, E
O
pt
io
n
V
al
ue
,P
ro
je
ct
V
al
ue
 
 

(2)
0,1,2
= 10.9613
Project value in (0,1,1) under Leapfrog/Laggard Strategy
Option value in (0,1,1) under Compulsive Strategy
Project value in (0,1,1) under Compulsive Strategy
Figure 13: Comparison of the value function F
(2)
0,1,1(E) under the two strategies for σ = 0.2 and λ = 0.1, 0.6
The left panel in Figure 14 illustrates the relative value of the two strategies for E < 
(2)
0,1,2
.
More speciﬁcally, (26) compares the ﬁrst branch of (15) with the ﬁrst branch of (23).
A
(2)
0,1,1
Eβ1
A
(2)
0,1∨2E
β1 + P
(2)
0,1,1
Eδ1
(26)
Similarly, the right panel compares the two strategies for E > 
(2)
0,2,2
> 
(2)
0,1,1
, i.e., the second branch
of (15) with the fourth branch of (23).
Φ
(1)
1,1
(E) +A
(2)
1,2,2
Eβ1 +A
(2)
1,1
Eδ1
λD2E
(ρ+λ−μ)(ρ−μ) − λI2ρ+λ + J (2)0,1,1Eδ2
(27)
According to the left panel, it is always better to adopt a compulsive strategy when the output
price is low because, even if a second technology were available, it would still be optimal to delay
21
investment until E = 
(2)
0,1,2
and then invest in the ﬁrst technology. Intuitively, the ﬁrm would have
to wait too long before adopting the second technology and the corresponding revenues do not
oﬀset the foregone cash ﬂows from ignoring the ﬁrst one. Notice also that the relative value of
the compulsive strategy increases as output price uncertainty decreases. This happens because a
more stable economic environment reduces the likelihood of an unexpected increase in the output
price, and, in turn, the opportunity cost from adopting the strategy. By contrast, as the right
panel illustrates, if the output price is high, then the relative value of the two strategies can drop
below one when λ is high, thereby indicating that the expected value from adopting a leapfrog or
a laggard strategy exceeds that of the compulsive strategy. This happens because a higher output
price reduces the expected time until investment in the second technology is justiﬁed, while, at the
same time, a high λ decreases the feasibility of the compulsive strategy by reducing the expected
time between subsequent innovations. Again, this result is more pronounced under lower price
uncertainty since this decreases the likelihood of an unexpected downturn.
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Figure 14: Relative value of F
(2)
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(2)
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Notice that these results are in line with Grenadier and Weiss (1997) who ﬁnd that, as the expected
time of arrival of an innovation increases, the probability of adopting a leapfrog or a laggard strategy
drops to zero while the probability of adopting a compulsive strategy increases. Here, we extend
Grenadier and Weiss (1997) by allowing for price uncertainty via a continuous time stochastic
process, thereby relaxing the assumption of the static representation of price uncertainty. This not
only enables the derivation of price thresholds corresponding to each strategy but also facilitates
the analysis of the endogenous relation between price and technological uncertainty and its impact
on the optimal strategy selection decision.
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8. Conclusions
We develop a real options framework for sequential investment in order to address the prob-
lem of optimal replacement of an emerging technology under price and technological uncertainty.
Although such features are crucial for investment in many industries, analytical formulations of
sequential investment that include both of them are limited. Consequently, we extend the real
options approach by incorporating these features into an analytical framework for sequential in-
vestment, in order to obtain insights on their combined impact on the investors’ propensity to
upgrade equipment. We analyse three investment strategies; compulsive, laggard, and leapfrog. In
the ﬁrst one, a ﬁrm invests in every technology that becomes available, whereas in the second and
third ones it can choose between an older and a newer technology respectively.
We ﬁnd that, under a compulsive strategy, an increase in the rate of innovation does not aﬀect
the optimal investment threshold when a ﬁrm holds a single investment option, even though it
increases the likelihood of an innovation. Interestingly, under multiple investment opportunities, the
impact of the rate of innovation on the initial investment decision is ambiguous. Indeed, although
a higher rate increases the likelihood of an innovation, and, in turn, the value of an investment
opportunity, the corresponding investment threshold may either increase or decrease. In fact,
uncertainty regarding the arrival of innovations may actually accelerate investment in a technology.
Moreover, a comparison of the strategies indicates that, when the output price is low, the compulsive
strategy is always better as long as, under a leapfrog/laggard strategy, the investment region is
dichotomous. However, when the rate of innovation is high, it is possible that the option to choose
between two technologies is more valuable than the immediate payoﬀ from investment in the ﬁrst
technology with an embedded option to switch to the second. The implications of the results are
crucial for the participants of many industries. For example, manufacturers of RE equipment can
develop more informed R&D strategies by anticipating the investors’ response to changes in the rate
that technologies become available, while policy measures for supporting RE via R&D funding can
become more eﬃcient by taking into account the investors’ propensity to adopt new technologies.
Apart from market and technological uncertainty, several other uncertainties related to RE
projects are amenable to real options, which, in turn, oﬀers directions for further research. For
example, it is possible to analyse policy uncertainty with respect to any change of a support scheme
via a regime–switching model based on a Markov–modulated Brownian motion. Hence, the current
framework can be extended to analyse not only the impact of policy uncertainty on investment and
operational decisions but also the endogenous relation between technological and policy uncertainty
as well as strategic interactions between competing investors and developers. Finally, it would be
interesting to allow for a diﬀerent stochastic process, e.g., mean reverting process, in order to relax
the limitations inherent in the geometric Brownian motion.
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APPENDIX
Compulsive Strategy with N = 1
The value of the investment option in state (0, 1, 1) is indicated in (A–1).
F
(1)
0,1,1
(E) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
(1− ρdt)EE
[
F
(1)
0,1,1
(E + dE)
]
, E < 
(1)
0,1,1
Φ
(1)
1,1
(E) , E ≥ (1)
0,1,1
(A–1)
By expanding the ﬁrst branch on the right–hand side of (A–1) using Itoˆ’s lemma, we obtain the
diﬀerential equation (A–2)
1
2
σ
2
E
2
F
(1)′′
0,1,1
(E) + μEF
(1)′
0,1,1
(E)− ρF (1)
0,1,1
(E) = 0 (A–2)
which, for E < 
(1)
0,1,1
, has the general solution that is indicated in (A–3).
F
(1)
0,1,1
(E) = A
(1)
0,1,1
Eβ1 + C
(1)
0,1,1
Eβ2 (A–3)
The second term on the right–hand side of (A–3) can be ruled out by noticing that as E → 0 the
value of the project becomes very small. However, since β2 < 0, we have C
(1)
0,1,1
Eβ2 → ∞ as E → 0.
Consequently, we must have C
(1)
0,1,1
= 0, and, thus,
F
(1)
0,1,1
(E) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
A
(1)
0,1,1
Eβ1 , E < 
(1)
0,1,1
Φ
(1)
1,1
(E) , E ≥ (1)
0,1,1
(A–4)
where A
(1)
0,1
and 
(1)
0,1,1
are determined via the value–matching and smooth–pasting conditions between
the two branches of (A–1) and are indicated in (A–5).
A
(1)
0,1,1

(1)β1
0,1,1
= Φ
(1)
1
(

(1)
0,1,1
)
β1A
(1)
0,1,1

(1)β1−1
0,1,1
= Φ
(1)′
1
(

(1)
0,1,1
)
⎫⎪⎬
⎪⎭⇒

(1)
0,1,1
=
β1
β1 − 1
I1(ρ− μ)
D1
A
(1)
0,1,1
=

(1)1−β1
0,1,1
β1
D1
ρ− μ
(A–5)
Next, we consider the value function in state (0, 0) where the ﬁrst technology has yet to become
available. The value function in state (0, 0) is described in (A–6)
Φ
(1)
0,0
(E) = (1− ρdt) (1− λdt)EE
[
Φ
(1)
0,0
(E + dE)
]
+ (1− ρdt)λdtEE
[
F
(1)
0,1,1
(E + dE)
]
(A–6)
and by expanding the right–hand side using Itoˆ’s lemma we obtain (A–7).
Φ
(1)
0,0
(E) = (1− (ρ+ λ)dt)
[
Φ
(1)
0,0
(E) +
1
2
σ
2
E
2
Φ
(1)′′
0,0
(E) dt+ μEΦ
(1)′
0,0
(E) dt
]
+ (1− ρdt)λdt
[
F
(1)
0,1,1
(E) +
1
2
σ
2
E
2
F
(1)′′
0,1,1
(E) dt+ μEF
(1)′
0,1,1
(E) dt
]
(A–7)
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After simplifying (A–7), we obtain the diﬀerential equation that describes Φ
(1)
0,0
(E).
1
2
σ
2
E
2
Φ
(1)′′
0,0
(E) + μEΦ
(1)′
0,0
(E)− (ρ+ λ)Φ(1)
0,0
(E) + λF
(1)
0,1,1
(E) = 0 (A–8)
Notice that the solution depends on whether E < 
(1)
0,1,1
or E ≥ (1)
0,1,1
, i.e.,⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
1
2σ
2
E
2
Φ
(1)′′
0,0
(E) + μEΦ
(1)′
0,0
(E)− (ρ+ λ)Φ(1)
0,0
(E) + λA
(1)
0,1,1
Eβ1 = 0 , E < 
(1)
0,1,1
1
2σ
2
E
2
Φ
(1)′′
0,0
(E) + μEΦ
(1)′
0,0
(E)− (ρ+ λ)Φ(1)
0,0
(E) + λD1Eρ−μ − λI1 = 0 , 
(1)
0,1,1
≤ E
(A–9)
The solution for Φ
(1)
0,0
(E) is indicated in (A–10), where, following the same reasoning as in (A–3),
we can rule out the terms containing the negative exponents, β2 and δ2 , in the top part of (A–10)
and the term containing the positive exponent δ1 in the bottom part of (A–10).
Φ
(1)
0,0
(E) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
A
(1)
0,1,1
Eβ1 +A
(1)
0,0
Eδ1 , E < 
(1)
0,1,1
λD1E
(ρ+λ−μ)(ρ−μ) −
λI1
ρ+λ +B
(1)
0,0
Eδ2 , 
(1)
0,1,1
≤ E
(A–10)
The endogenous constants A
(1)
0,0
< 0 and B
(1)
0,0
> 0 are determined via the value–matching and
smooth–pasting conditions between the two branches of (A–10) at 
(1)
0,1,1
and are indicated in (A–
11) and (A–12) respectively.
A
(1)
0,0
=

(1)−δ1
0,1,1
δ2 − δ1
[
λ(δ2 − 1)D1
(1)
0,1,1
(ρ+ λ− μ)(ρ− μ) + (β1 − δ2)A
(1)
0,1,1

(1)β1
0,1,1
− δ2λI1
ρ+ λ
]
(A–11)
B
(1)
0,0
=

(1)−δ2
0,1,1
δ1 − δ2
[
λ(1− δ1)D1
(1)
0,1,1
(ρ+ λ− μ)(ρ− μ) + (δ1 − β1)A
(1)
0,1,1

(1)β1
0,1,1
+
δ1λI1
ρ+ λ
]
(A–12)

Compulsive Strategy with N = 2
The value function in state (1, 2, 2) is indicated in (B–1)
F
(2)
1,2,2
(E) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
Φ
(1)
1,1
(E) + (1− ρdt)EE
[
F
(2)
1,2,2
(E + dE)
]
Φ
(2)
2,2
(E)
=
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
Φ
(1)
1,1
(E) +A
(2)
1,2,2
Eβ1 , E < 
(2)
1,2,2
Φ
(2)
2,2
(E) , E ≥ (2)
1,2,2
(B–1)
where the endogenous constant A
(2)
1,2,2
and investment threshold 
(2)
1,2,2
are determined via value–
matching and smooth–pasting conditions between the two branches of (B–1) and are indicated in
(B–2).
A
(2)
1,2,2
=

(2)1−β1
1,2,2
β1
D2 −D1
ρ− μ and 
(2)
1,2,2
=
β1
β1 − 1
I2(ρ− μ)
D2 −D1
(B–2)
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Next, we step back and consider the value function in state (1, 1), where the ﬁrst technology
has already been adopted but the second one is not available yet.
Φ
(2)
1,1
(E) = D1Edt− ρI1dt + (1− ρdt)λdtEE
[
F
(2)
1,2,2
(E + dE)
]
+ (1− ρdt)(1− λdt)EE
[
Φ
(2)
1,1
(E + dE)
]
(B–3)
Expanding the right–hand side of (B–3) using Itoˆ’s lemma we obtain (B–4)
1
2
σ
2
E
2
Φ
(2)′′
1,1
(E) + μEΦ
(2)′
1,1
(E)− (ρ+ λ)Φ(2)
1,1
(E) +D1E − ρI1 + λF
(2)
1,2,2
(E) = 0 (B–4)
and by solving (B–4) separately for the two regions of E that are indicated in (B–1) we have
Φ
(2)
1,1
(E) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
Φ
(1)
1,1
(E) +A
(2)
1,2,2
Eβ1 +A
(2)
1,1
Eδ1 , E < 
(2)
1,2,2
E[λD2+(ρ−μ)D1]
(ρ+λ−μ)(ρ−μ) − λI2ρ+λ +B
(2)
1,1
Eδ2 − I1 , 
(2)
1,2,2
≤ E
(B–5)
where the endogenous constants A
(2)
1,1
< 0 and B
(2)
1,1
> 0 are obtain via the value–matching and
smooth–pasting conditions between the two branched of (B–5) and are indicated in (B–6) and
(B–7).
A
(2)
1,1
=

(2)−δ1
1,2,2
δ2 − δ1
[
λ(δ2 − 1)(D2 −D1)
(2)
1,2,2
(ρ+ λ− μ)(ρ− μ) −
δ2λI2
ρ+ λ
− (δ2 − β1)A
(2)
1,2,2

(2)β1
1,2,2
]
(B–6)
B
(2)
1,1
=

(2)−δ2
1,2,2
δ1 − δ2
[
λ(1− δ1)(D2 −D1)
(2)
1,2,2
(ρ+ λ− μ)(ρ− μ) +
δ1λI2
ρ+ λ
+ (δ1 − β1)A
(2)
1,2,2

(2)β1
1,2,2
]
(B–7)
Next, the value of the option to invest in the ﬁrst technology with an embedded option to invest
in the second, F
(2)
0,1,1
(E), is indicated in (B–8)
F
(2)
0,1,1
(E) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
A
(2)
0,1,1
Eβ1 , E < 
(2)
0,1,1
Φ
(2)
1,1
(E) , 
(2)
0,1,1
≤ E
(B–8)
where Φ
(2)
1,1
(E) is described in (B–5), while A
(2)
0,1,1
and 
(2)
0,1,1
are determined numerically via the
value–matching and smooth–pasting conditions (B–9) and (B–10) respectively.
A
(2)
0,1,1

(2)β1
0,1,1
= Φ
(2)
1,1
(

(2)
0,1,1
)
+A
(2)
1,2,2

(2)β1
0,1,1
+A
(2)
1,1

(2)δ1
0,1,1
(B–9)
β1A
(2)
0,1,1

(2)β1
0,1,1
=
D1
(2)
0,1,1
ρ− μ + β1A
(2)
1,2,2

(2)β1
0,1,1
+ δ1A1,1
(2)δ1
0,1,1
(B–10)
Finally, the value function in state (0, 0) is described in (B–11)
Φ
(2)
0,0
(E) = (1− ρdt)λdtEE
[
F
(2)
0,1,1
(E + dE)
]
+ (1− ρdt)(1 − λdt)EE
[
Φ
(2)
0,0
(E + dE)
]
(B–11)
and the diﬀerential equation for Φ
(2)
0,0
(E) is indicated in (B–12).
1
2
σ
2
E
2
Φ
(2)′′
0,0
(E) + μEΦ
(2)′
0,0
(E)− (ρ+ λ)Φ(2)
0,0
(E) + λF
(2)
0,1,1
(E) = 0 (B–12)
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The expression of Φ
(2)
0,0
(E) is indicated in (B–13)
Φ
(2)
0,0
(E) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
A
(2)
0,1,1
Eβ1 +A
(2)
0,0
Eδ1 , E < 
(2)
0,1,1
λD1E
(ρ+λ−μ)(ρ−μ) − λI1ρ+λ +A
(2)
1,2,2
Eβ1 +A
(2)
1,1
Eδ1 +B
(2)
0,0
Eδ2 , 
(2)
0,1,1
≤ E
(B–13)
where the endogenous constants A
(2)
0,0
< 0 and B
(2)
0,0
> 0 are determined via the value–matching and
smooth–pasting conditions between the two branches of (B–13) and are indicated in (B–14) and
(B–15) respectively.
A
(2)
0,0
=

(2)−δ1
0,1,1
δ2 − δ1
[
λ(δ2 − 1)D1
(2)
0,1,1
(ρ+ λ− μ)(ρ− μ) + (β1 − δ2)A
(2)
0,1,1

(2)β1
0,1,1
− δ2λI1
ρ+ λ
+ (δ2 − β1)A
(2)
1,2,2

(2)β1
0,1,2
+ (δ2 − δ1)A
(2)
1,1
δ1
0,1,1
]
(B–14)
B
(2)
0,0
=

(2)−δ2
0,1,2
δ1 − δ2
[
λ(1− δ1)D1
(2)
0,1,1
(ρ+ λ− μ)(ρ− μ) + (δ1 − β1)A
(2)
0,1,1

(2)β1
0,1,1
+
δ1λI1
ρ+ λ
− (δ1 − β1)A
(2)
1,2,2

(2)β1
0,1,1
]
(B–15)

Proposition 4.1 ∀,m, n ∈ N the relative loss in Φ(n)
m,m
(E) converges to zero as λ → ∞, i.e.,
λ → ∞ ⇒ F
(n)
m,n,n
(E)− Φ(n)
m,m
(E)
F
(n)
m,n,n
(E)
→ 0, ∀E < (n)
m,n,n
Proof: The value of the option to invest in state (m,n, n) is described in (B–16).
F
(n)
m,n,n
(E) = Φm(E) m>0 +Am,nE
β1 , ∀E < (n)m,n,n (B–16)
Following from (9), (14), and (18), the value function in state (m,m) under a compulsive strategy
is described in (B–17)
Φ
(n)
m,m
(E) = Φ
(m)
m,m
(E) m>0 +A
(n)
m,n,n
Eβ1 +A
(n)
m,m
Eδ1 , ∀E < (n)
m,n,n
(B–17)
where the ﬁrst term on the right–hand side is the expected value of technology m and the second
term is the value of the option to invest in technology n, which is not available yet and thus the
option must be adjusted via the third term. Consequently, the relative loss in the value function
Φ
(n)
m,m
(E) due to technological uncertainty is indicated in (B–18).
F
(n)
m,n,n
− Φ(n)
m,m
F
(n)
m,n,n
=
−A(n)
m,m
Eδ1
Φ
(m)
m,m
(E) >0 +A
(n)
m,n,n
Eβ1
(B–18)
Notice that λ → ∞ ⇒ A(n)
m,m
→ 0. This happens because λ → ∞ ⇒ Eδ1 → ∞. Hence, if λ → ∞
and A
(n)
m,m
< 0, then A
(n)
m,m
Eδ1 → −∞. Hence, we conclude that λ → ∞ ⇒ A(n)
m,m
→ 0. Conse-
quently, λ → ∞ ⇒ F
(n)
m,n,n
−Φ(n)
m,m
F
(n)
m,n,n
→ 0. 
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Proposition 4.2: ∀,m, n ∈ N and ∀λ ∈ R+, Φ(m)
,
(E) ∈
[
Φ
()
,
(E), F
(m)
,m,m
(E)
)
, E ≤ (m)
,m,m
.
Proof: From (12) and (14) we have that the general expression for F
(m)
,m,m
(E) and Φ
(m)
,
(E) are:
F
(m)
,m,m
(E) = Φ
()
,
(E) +A
(m)
,m,m
Eβ1 (B–19)
Φ
(m)
,
(E) = Φ
()
,
(E) +A
(m)
,m,m
Eβ1 +A
(m)
,
Eδ1 (B–20)
(i) Notice that λ = 0 ⇒ δ1 = β1 , δ2 = β2 , A
(m)
,
= −A(m)
,m,m
and B
(n)
m,m
= 0. Thus, Φ
(m)
,
(E) =
Φ
()
,
(E), ∀E ≤ (m)
,m,m
, i.e., the value function at each state consists only of the value of the active
project since no embedded options are available.
(ii) Next, we consider the case λ → ∞. If λ > 0, then A(m)
,
< 0 and, since A
(m)
,m,m
> 0, we have
Φ
(m)
,
(E) = Φ
()
,
(E) + A
(m)
,m,m
Eβ1 + A
(m)
,
Eδ1 < Φ
(m)
,
(E) + A
(m)
,m,m
Eβ1 = F
(m)
,m,m
(E),∀E < (n)
,m,m
. Ac-
cording to the probability of no event occurring in the unit of time, we have λ → ∞ ⇒ P [N = 0] =
e−λ → 0. Hence, λ → ∞ ⇒ A(m)
,
Eδ1 → 0 and, thus, limλ→∞Φ(m), (E) = F
(m)
,m,m
(E), ∀E < (m)
,m,m
. 
Proposition 4.3 ∀,m, n ∈ N the impact of λ on (n)
,m,m
is non–monotonic.
Proof: From (B–17), the value of the option to invest in state (,m,m) can be written as in (B–21).
F
(n)
,m,m
(E) = Φ
()
,
(E) >0 +A
(n)
,m,m
Eβ1
= Φ
()
,
(E) >0 +
(
E

(n)
,m,m
)β1 [
Φ
(m)
m,m
(

(n)
,m,m
)
+A
(n)
m,n,n
β1
,m,m
+A
(n)
m,m

(n)δ1
,m,m
]
(B–21)
In order to investigate the impact of λ on the optimal investment threshold, we rewrite the MB and
MC of delaying investment. Notice that λ impacts only the last term of the left– and right–hand
side of (B–22).(
E

(n)
,m,m
)β1 [
Dm
ρ− μ +
β1

(n)
,m,m
Im − β1A
(n)
m,m

(n)δ1−1
,m,m
]
=
(
E

(n)
,m,m
)β1 [
β1Dm
ρ− μ − δ1A
(n)
m,m

(n)δ1−1
,m,m
]
(B–22)
Consequently, the overall impact of λ on 
(n)
,m,m
can be determined by its impact on these two terms.
Therefore, we deﬁne the function h(·) as in (B–23).
h(λ) = δ1A
(n)
m,m
− β1A
(n)
m,m
⇒ ∂h(λ)
∂λ
=
∂δ1
∂λ
A
(n)
m,m
+ δ1
∂A
(n)
m,m
∂λ
− β1
∂A
(n)
m,m
∂λ
(B–23)
As (B–24) indicates, when λ is small, β1A
(n)
m,m
decreases by more than δ1A
(n)
m,m
, which implies that
the MB decreases by more than the MC, and, as a result, the marginal value of delaying investment
decreases, thereby lowering the required investment threshold.
lim
λ→0
∂h(λ)
∂λ
= lim
λ→0
{
∂δ1
∂λ
A
(n)
m,m
+ δ1
∂A
(n)
m,m
∂λ
− β1
∂A
(n)
m,m
∂λ
}
= lim
λ→0
∂δ1
∂λ
A
(n)
m,m
+ β1 lim
λ→0
∂A
(n)
m,m
∂λ
− β1 lim
λ→0
∂A
(n)
m,m
∂λ
= β1 ×
(
−A(n)
m,n,n
)
< 0 (B–24)
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Similarly, at high values of λ, (B–25) indicates that the MC decreases by more than the MB and,
thus, the marginal value of delaying investment decreases.
lim
λ→∞
∂h(λ)
∂λ
= lim
λ→∞
{
∂δ1
∂λ
A
(n)
m,m
+ δ1
∂A
(n)
m,m
∂λ
− β1
∂A
(n)
m,m
∂λ
}
= lim
λ→∞
∂δ1
∂λ
A
(n)
m,m
+ lim
λ→∞
δ1 × lim
λ→∞
∂A
(n)
m,m
∂λ
− β1 lim
λ→∞
∂A
(n)
m,m
∂λ
= lim
λ→∞
(
∂δ1
∂λ
+ δ1 − β1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
× lim
λ→∞
∂A
(n)
m,m
∂λ︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
> 0 (B–25)

Proposition 5.1: ∀,m, n ∈ N we have (n)
,m,m
< 
(n)
,m,n
∀λ ∈ (0,+∞), whereas λ = 0 ⇒ (n)
,m,m
=

(n)
,m,n
and λ → ∞ ⇒ (n)
,m,m
→ (n)
,m,n
.
Proof: First, 
(n)
,m,m
< 
(n)
,m,n
follows from Proposition 4.3. In order to determine 
(n)
,m,n
, we rewrite
the value of the option to invest in state (,m, n) as in (B–26).
F
(n)
,m,n
(E) = max

(n)
,m,n>E
(
E

(n)
,m,n
)β1 [(n)
,m,n
Dm
ρ− μ − Im +A
(n)
m,n,n

(n)β1
,m,n
]
(B–26)
We can express the FONC by equating the MB of delaying investment to the MC as in (B–27).
Notice that the extra beneﬁt from the embedded option to invest in the second technology gets
cancelled with the extra cost, which implies that when the second technology is available it does
not aﬀect the decision to invest in the ﬁrst one.(
E

(n)
,m,n
)β1 [
β1Im

(n)
,m,n
+
Dm
ρ− μ + β1A
(n)
m,n,n

(n)β1−1
,m,n
]
=
⎛
⎝ E

(n)β1
,m,n
⎞
⎠[β1Dm
ρ− μ + β1A
(n)
m,n,n

(n)β1−1
,m,n
]
(B–27)
Consequently, solving with respect to 
(n)
,m,n
we have:

(n)
,m,n
=
β1
β1 − 1
Im(ρ− μ)
Dm
(B–28)
Notice that 
(n)
,m,m
= 
(n)
,m,n
for λ = 0. Similarly, as λ → ∞ the likelihood of at least one innovation
occurring converges to one, and, therefore, we have 
(n)
,m,m
→ (n)
,m,n
. 
Proposition 6.1: ∀E ∈
(
0, 
(2)
0,1,2
]
, if the investment region in state (0, 1 ∨ 2) is dichotomous, then
the compulsive strategy dominates the leapfrog/laggard strategy ∀λ ∈ R+.
Proof: Notice that for the compulsive strategy to dominate the leapfrog/laggard strategy, the
investment region in state (0,1∨2) must be dichotomous (De´camps et al., 2006). Otherwise, the
second waiting region does not exist, and, then, it is optimal to wait until E = 
(2)
0,2,2
and then invest
in the second technology (Dixit, 1993). Provided that this condition is satisﬁed, we have:
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(i) E ∈
(

(2)
0,1,2
, 
(2)
0,1,2
]
: Notice that in state (0,1,1) the expected NPV from investment in the ﬁrst
technology under a compulsive strategy is F
(2)
0,1,1
(E) = Φ
(2)
1,1
(E), where Φ
(2)
1,1
(E) indicated in (B–29).
Φ
(2)
1,1
(E) = D1Edt− ρI1dt+ (1− ρdt)λdtEE
[
F
(2)
1,2,2
(E + dE)
]
+ (1− ρdt)(1 − λdt)EE
[
Φ
(2)
1,1
(E + dE)
]
, E > 
(2)
0,1,2
≥ (2)
0,1,1
(B–29)
By contrast, under a laggard strategy, the expected value function in state (0,1,1) is the same as
(B–29) but is conditional on the arrival of the second technology, as indicated in (B–30).
F
(2)
0,1,1
(E) = (1− ρdt)λdtEE
[
F
(2)
1,2,2
(E + dE)
]
+ (1− ρdt)(1− λdt)EE
[
F
(2)
0,1,1
(E + dE)
]
, 
(2)
0,1,2
≤ E ≤ (2)
0,1,2
(B–30)
From (B–29) and (B–30) it follows that Φ
(2)
1,1
(E) ≥ F (2)
0,1,1
(E),∀E > (2)
0,1,2
.
(ii) E ∈
(
0, 
(2)
0,1,2
]
: The derivation is similar to (i). Intuitively, the compulsive strategy dominates
∀E < (2)
0,1,1
, since, unlike in the leapfrog/laggard strategy, the option to invest in the ﬁrst technology
is not contingent upon the arrival of the second one. 
Proposition 6.2: ∃ λ1 , λ2 ∈ R+ with λ1 ≤ λ2 :
i : ∀λ > λ1 , ∃B ⊆
(

(2)
0,2,2
,∞
)
: ∀E ∈ B, the leapfrog strategy dominates
ii : ∀λ > λ2 , ∃A ⊂
[

(2)
0,1,2
, 
(2)
0,2,2
)
: ∀E ∈ A, the leapfrog/laggard strategy dominates
Proof: (i) Notice that under a compulsive strategy and E ≥ (2)
0,2,2
F
(2)
0,1,1
(E) = Φ
(1)
1,1
(E) +A
(2)
1,2,2
Eβ1 +A
(2)
1,1
Eδ1 ⇒
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
λ = 0 ⇒ F (2)
0,1,1
(E) = Φ
(1)
1,1
(E)
limλ→∞ F
(2)
0,1,1
(E) = Φ
(1)
1,1
(E) +A
(2)
1,2,2
Eβ1
(B–31)
and, according to Proposition 4.3, λ ↗ ⇒
∣∣∣A(2)
1,1
∣∣∣ ↘ which implies that ∂F (2)0,1,1 (E)∂λ > 0 ∀λ ∈ R+.
Additionally, under a leapfrog strategy and E ≥ (2)
0,2,2
F
(2)
0,1,1
(E) =
λD2E
(ρ+ λ− μ)(ρ− μ) −
λI2
ρ+ λ
+ J
(2)
0,1,1
Eδ2 ⇒
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
λ = 0 ⇒ F (2)
0,1,1
(E) = 0
limλ→∞ F
(2)
0,1,1
(E) =
D2E
ρ−μ − I2
(B–32)
Consequently,
1. If λ is low, e.g., λ = 0, then the compulsive strategy dominates since Φ
(2)
1,1
(E) ≥ 0, ∀E ≥ 0
2. As λ → ∞, the leapfrog strategy dominates ∀E ∈
(

(2)
0,2,2
,∞
)
. Indeed, if we denote by ε the
output price that satisﬁes (B–33), i.e.,
D2ε
ρ− μ − I2 =
D1ε
ρ− μ − I1 +A
(2)
1,2,2
εβ1 ⇔ Φ(2)
2,2
(ε) = F
(2)
1,2,2
(ε) (B–33)
then ε is the point of indiﬀerence between the NPV in state (2, 2) and (1,2,2), and, as such,
ε < 
(2)
0,2,2
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Next, for positive and ﬁnite values of λ, we set L =
{
λ| ∃B ⊆
(

(2)
0,2,2
,∞
)
: leapfrog dominates ∀E ∈ B
}
.
Then, from (1) and (2), ∃λ1 ∈ R+ : λ1 = minλ ∈ L and
λ1D2E
(ρ+ λ1 − μ)(ρ− μ)
− λ1I2
ρ+ λ1
+ J
(2)
0,1,1
Eδ2 = Φ
(2)
1,1
(E) +A
(2)
1,2,2
Eβ1 +A
(2)
1,1
Eδ1 (B–34)
while ∀λ ∈ L > λ1 ∃B ⊆
(

(2)
0,2,2
,∞
)
such that the leapfrog strategy dominates ∀E ∈ B, i.e.,
λD2E
(ρ+ λ− μ)(ρ− μ) −
λI2
ρ+ λ
+ J
(2)
0,1,1
Eδ2 ≥ Φ(2)
1,1
(E) +A
(2)
1,2,2
Eβ1 +A
(2)
1,1
Eδ1 , ∀λ ∈ B (B–35)
(ii) The derivation is similar to (i) and follows from the convexity of F
(2)
0,1,1
and the value–matching
and smooth–pasting conditions ensure that F
(2)
0,1,1
is C1 ∀E > 0. 
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